We formulate and solve dynamic programming models extending search theory to p1q multiple indivisible units and p2q perfectly divisible assets. Buyers arrive seeking randomly many units at a random price in p2q, or with a random limit order in p2q. The seller can partially exercise orders -hence, search at the margin.
Introduction
We develop a unified theory of search for the sale of many units of a good, or of a large divisible asset position. Of course, if each buyer who arrives seeks to purchase the entire position at a constant unit price, then a reservation price rule is optimal, per usual. In our motivational example, the seller holds finitely many indivisible units and a buyer arrives every period seeking a random number at a random bid price. In our primary continuously divisible units model, buyers periodically arrive with random price-quantity limit orders. In both models, the seller may partially exercise buyer requests -hence, search at the margin. We formulate and solve this as a dynamic programming problem.
Extending dynamic search theory is important, as the single unit restriction limits its scope of application. Dynamic search has so far largely been the province of wage search (McCall, 1970) , and rare market environments where one seeks to trade a single unit. In multi-unit trade settings, the general dynamic search model has been a bridge too far, and so has been simplified by assuming a one period horizon, or fixing outside options.
Dynamic search theory resolves how choices reflect both the randomness of options and delay costs. A reservation price balances the optionality -i.e. the expected surplus over the reservation price -of a better stopping payoff and the search costs. Riskier prices increase optionality, and thereby encourage more ambitious search by way of a higher reservation price. But with multi-unit search, optionality cuts two ways, as both an immediate benefit, and an opportunity cost of delaying the optionality of one's inframarginal units. This endogenous cost, hereby called the holding cost, is new in our paper, and discourages ambitious search. The holding cost increases in the position, since each unit offers some optionality. As a result, each additional unit must offer greater optionality to compensate for the rising holding cost; therefore, the reservation price must decrease, and eventually it falls to the dividend value (see Figures 2 and 6).
A. Three Economic Examples.
Absent an organized and sufficiently thick market, multiunit search matters. Market thickness is indeed a matter of the time frame. When a vast number of goods must be quickly sold -as in a liquidation sale with seasonal products, fashion clothing, or hi tech products -retailers face a multiunit buyer search exercise. Retailers annually liquidate thousands of stores and billions of dollars of inventory (Bitran and Mondschein, 1997) .
For a second class of examples, consider how an increasing share of workers hire out their time piecemeal. A lawyer or accountant just starting out may be unable to secure enough billable hours, and instead take side jobs working for another firm. After that, he may entertain periodically arriving demands on his increasingly limited time.
A class of examples that may best fit our assumptions and illustrate our predictions are ticket sales for timed events like an opera or an airline flight. If buyers seek tickets randomly as opportunities and needs arise, then the impending deadline induces a thin market. In a pivotal early operations research paper on airline ticket pricing, Lee and Hersh (1993) develop a dynamic programming search model in which reservation prices rise as the booking capacity falls; we relate to this in an indivisible unit model in §2.2. The empirical work has since precisely measured this paper's capacity findings. In line with our results, Williams (2013) finds evidence that expected revenue (i.e. value) is increasing and concave in the unsold capacity, with prices rising as seats are sold. 
B. Summary of Results.
Our motivational model in §2 with indivisible asset holdings subsumes standard wage and price search as a special case. There, the seller trades off an immediate sure gain for an uncertain future one; the reservation wage balances these concerns, accounting for the optionality. With multiple units, rather than a single Bellman value, we have a sequence of values, one for each level of holdings. The value increments govern trading behavior, acting as the seller's marginal opportunity cost. The reservation price for each level holdings equals the incremental value -thus leaving the seller indifferent about the last sale. So equipped, we reason by induction on the holdings, proving that the reservation price falls with more units, and that the value rises but with diminishing increments. As the units are sold off, holding costs fall, since fewer remain to be sold. The impact can be dramatic: the reservation price rises from 2.9 to 8.3 in Figure 2 as ten units are sold. The seller's ability to partially act upon buyer demands is critical, as reservation prices need not fall when the seller cannot partially act on buyer offers.
Our main model assumes a perfectly divisible asset position and so employs standard Lagrangian marginal analysis. To understand the intensive margin, we next consider in §3 the one-stage decision problem that confronts a seller. In this second illustrative model, we show how the intensive margin depends on the shape of the value function. If the value is convex, then selling is all-other-nothing; a special case is wage search, where a single reservation wage suffices. Interior selling decisions only arise with concave value functions, and in this case, the marginal value dictates the seller's supply curve. So inspired, our voyage indeed finds that value functions are concave with multiunit search.
In the general model in §4, an impatient owner of a large position in a divisible asset wishes to sell it off. The seller discounts the future, possibly earning dividends on his holdings until any sale -for instance, he might perchance earn a rental fee on unsold durable goods. The seller lacks an organized market, and instead can only slowly sell it off to buyers randomly arriving in continuous time. A focal special case is stationary Poisson arrivals, which standardly subsumes discrete time. Buyers have a random bid price and a random purchase cap. This is consistent with the "Name-Your-Own-Price" (NYOP) business model of Priceline, and a vast number of Third world markets.
We employ recursion logic to characterize the option value of search, as well as the larger Bellman value, which includes the present value of dividends. Parallel to the diminishing value increments with indivisible units in §2, Theorems 1 and 3 highlight how value functions are increasing and strictly concave. Theorem 2 uses contraction proof logic normally reserved for value functions to deduce that the marginal value exists. We argue that if the value function is differentiable, then its derivative defines a contraction mapping that admits a unique bounded fixed point that is continuous.
2 Parallel to the logic for indivisible units, holding costs strictly increase in the position. Corollary 2 summarizes our economic logic in a key formula: the time cost of the marginal value is the sum of the dividend, and the optionality of the unit, minus the holding costs. The trading schedule evolves as the asset position falls, reflecting the endogenous option value of a smaller position. Value concavity gives the second order conditions that allow marginal analysis. The seller's ask price is the inverse marginal value, as was the reservation price in §2. The equivalent supply function -the maximum sold at any price -then admits a simple formula in Corollary 4 that is increasing in the price, and linearly increasing in position. All told, the seller sells more with higher bid prices, and less with a smaller position. He refuses to sell for bid prices below a choke price, wants to sell out (or liquidate) for bid prices above a higher sell-all price, and partially unwinds his position for intermediate prices -truncated by the buyer's cap in all cases.
The falling marginal value is driven by the finite buyer purchase caps. But we can say something stronger. Consider our indivisible units model with unit demands. Here, holding costs are the discounted continuation values, and these rise in the holdings, but with diminishing increments. Consequently, reservation prices -which are pulled down by the holding costs -have diminishing decrements. With a continuously divisible asset, Theorem 4 extends this result, finding that the marginal value is convex in the position if the purchase cap density is decreasing (an extrapolation of unit demands).
Given the convex marginal value, the cost of selling an extra unit -analogous to the marginal cost function in producer theory -is convex in the quantity sold (see Figure 5 ). Corollary 6 finds that its inverse, suggestively called a supply curve, is a concave function of the price whenever it is positive. So while the seller sells more when the buyer offers a more generous bid, his supply elasticity tapers off at larger positions. In our paper, search frictions are captured by the buyer arrival rates, the purchase cap distribution, and the seller's impatience. The value function and trading behavior change in these frictional measures -e.g. a thinner or more sporadic market, or holding more of a firesale. Intuitively, with greater frictions, the search optionality drops, and the value and marginal value of more assets both fall too (Theorem 5). For an intuition, assume buyers arrive less often. Then the seller trades more in each meeting, and so is less price sensitive; accordingly, his value function falls and flattens, as seen in Figure 6 . Our most surprising comparative static concerns purchase caps, which play a central role. Whereas the seller standardly profits from greater price risk, Theorem 6 shows how he is harmed by a riskier purchase cap distribution, due to the value concavity.
The seller adjusts his behavior when he grows more impatient, buyers arrive more frequently, or the price or purchase cap distribution changes. He simultaneously adjusts on two margins: first, his intensive willingness to sell in each trading opportunity and second, his extensive willingness to pass altogether on trades, and thereby adjust the waiting time between sales. For instance, Theorems 7 and 8 find that a more impatient seller, or one with a smaller dividend, in some ways acts as if his asset position is larger -in all cases, the mean time to trade falls and supply increases.
As is well-known, search models capture settings with temporal market power, where prices are bargained -as holds in many market where buyers interact directly with the seller. Our default limit order model makes the standard assumption of search theory, and assumes that buyers venture their willingness to pay, and sellers optimally respond.
3 Intuitively, this assigns all bargaining power to the seller. But our theory remains tractable and our results robust in §8 when Nash bargaining fixes the trade quantity and price. We uncover a general principle -that greater bargaining power for buyers is formally equivalent to increased search frictions: It raises the supply, reduces the negotiated price, improving the ease of trade. All told, the price and quantity move oppositely. With bargaining, for instance, the supply still rises in the position, but the negotiated price falls. Greater bargaining power for buyers also lowers the waiting times between sales. As an application, if two buyers A and B share the same reservation price, but B wishes to acquire a larger share of the seller's position, then B will pay a higher negotiated price. Crucially, seller B does not get a quantity discount.
C. Literature. Our paper develops a dynamic theory of multiunit search. But it helps to document the economic settings where this need is most salient. In industrial organization, the classic price or option search literature has conspicuously assumed single unit search.
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But trade models are the primary potential application of search at the margin, since goods, assets, and money are often divisible.
5 These models avoid solving a dynamic search exercise with a perfectly divisible asset. Monetary theory is the largest body of work here (Lagos, Rocheteau, and Wright, 2015) . Lagos and Wright (2005) delivers a tractable monetary random matching model with divisible assets and a divisible good. They assume that search takes one period ("day"), and is followed by an unchanging frictionless centralized "night" market that fixes the outside option value of money. Closer to us, Molico (2006) removes the access to the "night market", and numerically finds a concave value of money holdings in a dynamic equilibrium model. He assumes a strictly concave payoff function and an increasing and convex marginal production cost. Our theory applies if we swap the roles of buyers and sellers, and think of limit orders as random convex cost functions. We conjecture that even with linear stage payoffs, value concavity would still arise, as in our model, due to the convex cost functions.
Periodic access to a market is the search friction underlying Lagos and Rocheteau (2009) , who assume divisible assets in an equilibrium search model of an over-the-counter market. Investors randomly meet dealers, who trade in a competitive market. Unlike our paper, investors do not face a purchase cap restriction, and thus the asset optionality is constant. To wit, while the investor's selling strategy depends forwardly on the expected market price, it is independent of his asset position -the essence of our search at the margin. Our value function is concave for a dynamic reason due to the random purchase caps, whereas theirs inherits the assumed concavity of the static utility of consumption.
Since our paper lacks a close prequel, we next build on the McCall wage search model in §2, assuming finitely many units. We illustrate the intensive margin, and the importance of value concavity, in §3. For the general model in §4, we characterize the value function and supply schedule in §5, and do sensitivity analysis in §6. We analyze the seller's behavior and supply in §7, and introduce bargaining in §8. Our indivisible units example in §2 is founded on the interplay of values and reservation price, and logically proceeds via induction proofs. But the continuous asset model in §4-8 is based on value functions and supply schedules, and exploits contraction recursion proofs. igure 1: Search with Finitely Many Units. The optimal reservation prices R n (left circles) and the optimal values V n (right circles) when P " Γp4, 2q, k " 0.1, and β " 0.8. Our effects are large: Reservation prices R n fall from 7.6 to 1.6, with diminishing steps |R n´Rn´1 |. A reservation price fixed at R 1 (leftˆ's) yields a lower valueV n (rightˆ's).
Sequential Search for Multiple Indivisible Units
We first characterize the optimal gradual sale of many indivisible goods, subsuming existing single unit search theory as a special case. In the first case, arriving buyers have unit demands, but in the second case, they have random multi-unit demands.
Single Unit Sales
Consider a home builder who can rent out n unsold homes for a dividend κ ą 0 per period, or a ticket seller who earns nothing (κ " 0) on held inventory.
6 A new home or ticket buyer arrives every period with a take-it-or-leave-it random price P from cdf F . The price P has positive variance on the support rp,ps, and exceeds the present value of dividends κ{p1´βq with positive probability. The seller has discount factor 7 β ă 1.
We start with a key insight on how holdings impact the optimal reservation price. The per period return on the value V n pRq of holding n units given reservation price R is: 8 p1´βqV n pRq " nκ`βp1´F pRqqrEpP´R|P ě Rq´pV n´Vn´1´R qs given continuation valuesV n´1 ,V n . If the reservation price R rises, falling optionality p1´F pRqqEpP´R|P ě Rq balances 9 rising opportunity costs p1´F pRqqpV n´Vn´1´R q.
6 We subsume Dixit's fun 2012 paper that lacks general results. Ours also is a theory of the six bullet dynamic optimization in the 1971 movie "Dirty Harry", whose last bullet was most valuable.
7 For computing expected payoffs, the timing is as follows: trades happen in the morning, values are computed at noon, dividends are received in the afternoon, and discounting happens at midnight. 8 We rewriteV n pRq " nκ`βrp1´F pRqqpEpP |P ě Rq`V n´1 q`F pRqV n s assumingV n pRq "V n . 9 Indeed, the optionality ş R pp´RqdF ppqdp has R derivative F pRq´1 ă 0, which is negative of the R derivative of p1´F pRqqpR`V n´1´Vn q at the optimum R "V n´Vn´1 . See also footnote 28 in §A.1.
But with multiple unit search, when holdings rise, the continuation valueV n´1 rises, and the marginal gains to searching fall -the optimal reservation price R falls.
The value function V n of the n units obeys the Bellman equation p♦q: V n " nκβ E pmaxtP`V n´1 , V n uq. The optimal reservation price R n for the nth unit -the least acceptable bid price one -leaves one indifferent about selling p♥q: R n`Vn´1 " V n . Standard search theory is the n " 1 case, i.e. V 1 " κ`βE pmaxtP, V 1 uq, since V 0 " 0. The optionality of the nth unit is the expected excess of the price over the reservation price p♣q: Ω n " EpmaxtP´R n , 0uq. Finally, we focus on the search option value, or the excess over dividend present value p♠q: W n " V n´n κ{p1´βq. As seen in Figure 1 :
Proposition 1 As asset holdings n increase, the option value W n strictly increases, the optimal reservation price R n strictly decreases, but with diminishing steps |R n´Rn´1 |. Its formula is:
Proof: Write p♦q as V n " nκ`βpEpmaxtP, R n uq`V n´1 q " nκ`βpR n`Ωn`Vn´1 q, using p♥q and p♣q. Subtract V n´1 " pn´1qκ`βV n´1`p 1´βqW n´1 , which reworks (♠), to get the reservation price formula p‹): R n " κ`βpR n`Ωn q´p1´βqW n´1 . To wit, one expects to secure the dividend immediately, and the gross price R n`Ωn starting next period. For example, R 1 " κ`βpR 1`Ω1 q in standard wage search. The last term in p‹) does not appear in standard search theory, as it reflects the multiple unit sales. It is the holding cost, or the time cost of delaying the continuation search option value with one fewer unit p1´βqW n´1 . Lastly, using p♠q, then p♦q and p♥q, and then p♣q:
thereby proving (1). Hence, the reservation price R n falls in the holdings n, as it moves inversely to the optionality βΩ n´1 , which increases in the option values W n´1 , by (2). For historical context, in their study of airline ticket pricing, Lee and Hersh (1993) studied this discrete-time dynamic programming model with a finite price mesh. They find a weakly falling reservation price. We allow for dividends, and deduce strictly falling reservation prices for if possible prices sometimes exceed the present value of dividends.
Multiple Unit Sales and Limit Orders
Now, assume a buyer arrives every period wishing " 1, 2, . . . units with arrival chance α ą 0, where α 1`α2`¨¨¨" 1. Define the running arrival chance A n " α 1`¨¨¨`αn . Then α 1 " 1 in §2.1. We assume that the buyer arrives with a limit order demand Figure 2: Reservation Prices and Divisibility. The optimal reservations prices R n (at left) and value functions V n (at right) given prices P " Γp4, 2q, dividend k " 0.5, and discount factor β " 0.8. With no purchase caps, optimal reservation prices are constant (ˆ): one sells or rejects a price. But with five equilikely purchase caps " t1, 2, 3, 4, 5u, prices fall dramatically. Reservation prices are non-monotone with all-or-nothing sell decisions (white circles), but fall in the one's holdings if unit trades are allowed (black circles). At right, the values are all strictly higher given optimal exercise of this option.
pp, q for purchase of at most units at a random price P . Lee and Hersh (1993) attack this multiple unit demands problem only numerically, assuming finitely many prices. They give an example with a non-monotone reservation price. We offer our own simple example in Figure 2 . We recover a dramatically falling reservation price by adding an intensive margin optimization, allowing the seller to partially meet the limit order.
For a fixed price, the seller is indifferent across all buyer demands that liquidate his holdings, given n units. So the relevant buyer arrival chances α n P R n obey α n " α for all ď n´1 and α n n " 1´A n´1 . Given the vector of past option values pW 1 , . . . , W n´1 q " W n´1 , the next search option value W n is a fixed point W n " F n pW n´1 , W n |α n q, where:
A feasible strategy given n units is to employ the selling policy optimal for n´1 units, but incremented by one if p ą κ{p1´βq. Since this option is immediately useful with chance α n n ą 0, this policy yields extra payoff at least βα n n EpmaxtP´κ{p1´βq, 0uq ą 0 if one liquidates whenever it is myopically profitable. Hence, W 1 ă W 2 ă¨¨¨ă W n ă¨¨¨.
Proposition 2 Option value increments are positive and falling: ∆W 1 ą¨¨¨ą ∆W n ą 0.
The sales policy now must dictate a quantity to sell for every limit order pp, q. The seller uses search at the margin if he sells the maximal i ď units for which p ě R n´i`1 , namely, a reservation price that only depends on the final holdings n´i, and not the sales quantity or original holdings. Search at the margin is the natural extension
Optionality of the nth unit
Optionality of the single unit Ω 1
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igure 3: Search Optionality. In the search Bellman equation V 1 " κ`βE maxtP, V 1 u with one unit at left, the max term is V 1 plus the expected ex post surplus maxtp´V 1 , 0u. If one may sell of n ě 1 units at price p, the analogous surplus is the upper envelope U n pp, q " max 0ďiď ppi`V n´i´Vn q. Wage search is the " n " 1 special case (as V 1 " ∆V 1 ). Its plot at right kinks upwards at p " ∆V n´i`1 for sales of i " 1, . . . , units. Then ErU n pP, qs " ř n j"n`1´ Ω j is the optionality on the sale, reflecting holding costs. The option value formula in Proposition 2 accounts for chances of " 1, . . . , n buyers.
of the reservation price rule of §2.1, and is formally a discrete first order condition. Proposition 2 supplies the discrete second order condition that justifies its optimality. Intuitively, we intersect supply and demand curves, and choose the demand curve price.
We next argue that the reservation price falls in the holdings, and increases in supply, and therefore supply is monotone in the bid price.
Corollary 1 Search at the margin is optimal. The reservation price for selling i of n units equals R n´i`1 " ∆V n´i`1 , and falls in the final holdings n´i. Its formula is:
The formula (4) subsumes (1), with α 1 " 1 and α j " 0 for j ą 1. The time cost of the reservation price p1´βqR n is the dividend κ plus the discounted optionality Ω n , less the holding cost β ř n´1 j"1 α n´j Ω j , or discounted foregone surplus of holding an extra unit.
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Proposition 2 proves ∆R n " ∆ 2 W n ă 0. Figure 3 depicts the richer optionality story in the proof in §A.2. The claim in Proposition 1 that ∆ 2 R n ą 0 does not extend here, since that relied on the now inapplicable identity p1´βqW n " βΩ n . In robust numerical examples, the reservation price can fall at an increasing or decreasing rate. For sure, as seen in §2.1, reservation prices fall at a decreasing rate when α n " p1, 0, . . . , 0q.
10 The holding cost β ř n´1 j"1 α n´j Ω j in (4) is no longer simply the time cost p1´βqW n´1 on the value with one less unit. Generalizing our deduction (2), we derive p1´βqW n " β ř n j"1 p1´A n´j qΩ j in §A.2. When the utility function upaq is strictly concave (middle), one may partially exercise the stopping option. The optimal supply y˚ppq solves the FOC p´u 1 p1´yq " 0 (right panel) and its shape requires a characterization of the marginal continuation value u 1 paq.
Search at the Continuous Margin: A Foretaste
We now explore the intensive margin -how much to sell -in our main model with a perfectly divisible asset. Consider a two period setting without discounting, and take as given the continuation value function u. In the first period, a seller holds a single unit of an asset and meets a buyer, proposing some price p ą 0. The seller chooses how much y ě 0 to sell. In period two, he derives utility up1´yq. We assume up0q " 0 and that u is increasing. This trade opportunity has optimal value vppq " max yPr0,1s ppy`up1´yqq. If utility upaq is convex, then the value is piecewise convex vppq " maxtp, up1qu, as in the left panel of Figure 4 . The outside option is worth up1q and the inside option p. In a stationary wage search model, up1q is the reservation wage and p the current wage offer (McCall, 1970) . The seller fully exercises his option for high enough prices p ě up1q; otherwise, he sells nothing. In this case, the divisibility assumption is irrelevant: the same outcome arises when assets are both indivisible (y " 0, 1) or divisible (y P r0, 1s).
Assume next a strictly concave and differentiable continuation value upaq on r0, 1s. As seen in Figure 4 (middle), he sells nothing if p ă u 1 p1q, and liquidates for all high prices p ě u 1 p0`q. For intermediate prices u 1 p1q ď p ă u 1 p0`q, he partially liquidates his position, and the FOC p´u 1 p1´yq " 0 fixes the optimal supply y˚ppq " 1´pu 1 q´1ppq.
So a strict concave value upaq yields a positive and increasing supply (the solid line at right in Figure 4 ). As the slope of the ex ante value vppq is the sales yppq, to understand the trading behavior requires characterizing the marginal continuation value.
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We thus shift focus from Bellman values to Bellman value functions in dynamic search. We recursively prove that, despite linear dividend payoffs, the utility function u is differentiable and strictly concave, and the marginal utility u 1 strictly convex. We derive predictions for the value function and resulting trading behavior.
The Continuously Divisible Asset Model
Time is continuous on r0, 8q. An infinitely-lived seller owns a large but finite asset position a ă 8 of a perfectly divisible asset (like his holdings in §2). The asset pays a constant flow dividend 0 ď k ă 8 per unit share, discounted at the interest rate r ą 0. We posit two signature ingredients of search models, that the seller periodically meets a buyer with a random offer. Our arrival process of buyers is quite general: At any time t ě 0, the waiting time τ until the next arrival is a random variable with cdf Γ t pτ q, a differentiable function of t and τ . To capture positive search frictions, we assume some delay: Γ t p0q ă 1. If Γ t has support r0, T´ts, there is a deadline T ă 8, after which arrivals cease. For instance, ticket markets shut down after an event or airline flight. A tractable and common special case is the time-stationary Poisson model, where Γ t pτ q " 1´e´ρ τ for all t ě 0, and ρ ą 0. Notably, this continuous time model is behaviorally equivalent to a discrete time model with buyers arriving every period, discount factor β " ρ{pr`ρq ă 1, and per period dividend κ " kp1´Epe´r τ qq{r " k{pr`ρq, as in §2.
In our key model twist, buyers' offers specify limit orders pp, xq, namely, not only a bid price p ą 0, but also a purchase cap x ą 0, or the maximum desired quantity. The price and cap are possibly dependent random variables P, X, independent of the arrival times τ .
12 We assume a cdf F pp, xq with bounded continuous density f pp, xq, weakly falling in x, and marginals gppq, hpxq ą 0 on p0, 8q. Denote expectations over P, X, τ by E t . To ensure a well-defined search problem and binding purchase caps, we assume ErP s ă 8 and ErXs ă 8. Also, the marginal hpxq and conditional expected price ErP |xs are uniformly bounded: hpxq ďh ă 8, and ErP |xs ďp ă 8 for all x ą 0. Given the buyer's offer pp, xq, the seller can then elect any supply y P r0, mintx, aus. This arises, e.g., whenever buyer pp, xq derives quasilinear utility p¨minty, xu minus his costs, where y is the supply. In §8, we explore a richer alternative model in which the buyer has a reservation price w ą 0 and a purchase cap x ą 0, with density f pw, xq. In that case, the terms of trade -price and supply pp, yq -arise from Nash bargaining.
the asset price, the trade size is y ď a, his optimization is max yďa ppy`upa´yqq.
12 We use the standard probability protocol that upper case (eg. P, X) are random variables, and lower case their realizations (p, x). We standardly shorten conditional expectations ErP |X " xs to ErP |xs.
After selling y ď a at price p, search continues with the new position a´y, and a cash inflow of py. The seller maximizes his expected present value V t paq of cash flows from dividends and sales at time t, namely, V t paq " ak{r`E t ř 8 i"1 e´r τ i y i pP i´k {rq where the expectation is taken with respect to the random sequence of trade times τ i , bid prices P i , and supplies y i ď X i , i " 1, 2, . . ., where pP i , X i q and pτ i q are governed by F and Γ t . For expositional ease, we restrict to stationary Poisson arrivals when we flesh out proofs in §5, as well as for the analysis in §6-8. General proofs for τ " Γ t are in §B.
The Value Function and Selling Strategy
When meeting a buyer, the seller optimally decides whether and how much to exploit the proposed terms of trade. In so doing, he trades off a sure immediate gain for the option value of future trades. Since one available policy is never to trade, we have V t paq ě ak{r. As the right side is an unbounded function of a when k ą 0, we instead focus on the net-of-dividend option value function W t paq " V t paq´ak{r ě 0.
We solve the problem recursively, using a dynamic programming model whose state variable is the position a ě 0. The option value discounts until the first buyer arrives, if he does so before the deadline. The trade surplus is scaled by the expected discounted factor B t " e´r τ 1 r0,T´ts pτ q, since arrivals stop after calendar time T (where 1 r0,T´ts " 0).
Let C be the space of bounded continuous functions on r0, 8q 2 with the sup norm.
The Bellman value W is a fixed point W " T W of the Bellman operator T : C Ñ C:
To wit, upon meeting a buyer with offer pp, xq before the deadline, the seller maximizes the present value py`V t`τ pa´yq " pp´k{rqy`W t`τ pa´yq`ak{r by choosing sales y.
The supply function Y t pp, x, aq is the solution. We prove that it is uniquely defined.
Lemma 1 T is a contraction with a unique bounded and continuous fixed point W t in C.
The option value function W t admits an easy upper bound. Any expected discount factor β t " E t pe´r τ q ă 1 is at mostβ " sup t β t ă 1 -hereby exploiting the assumed inequality Γ t p0q ă 1. With an infinite position a " 8, one exploits all offers up to the purchase cap. Yet even here, one only secures a finite present value W "βEpP Xq{p1´βq ă 8.
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The proof in §B.1 shows that the operator T preserves this upper bound.
14 Let C 1 be the space of bounded and continuous functions on assets a P r0, 8q. We prove concavity using recursive methods along with convex duality theory of Fenchel.
Theorem 1
The option value W t paq is a concave and strictly increasing function of a.
Proof : Since T is a contraction and concavity in a is a closed property in C 1 with the sup norm, it suffices that T preserves concavity in a, for all t ď T .
15 When meeting a buyer, the seller chooses the post trade asset position z " a´y from the convex constraint set Cpxq " Y a tpz, aq| maxta´x, 0u ď z ď au. To use convexity theory, we eliminate the constraint. We thus introduce the characteristic function χ Cpxq pz, aq " 0 if pz, aq P Cpxq and`8 otherwise. As Cpxq is convex and χ Cpxq is convex, we rewrite (5) as:
For the recursion, assume thatW t is concave in a for t ď T . Then pp´k{rqz´W t`τ pzqχ
Cpxq pz, aq is convex in pz, aq, and hence min zě0 rpp´k{rqz´W t`τ pzq`χ Cpxq pz, aqs is convex in assets a, for t`τ ď T , by Theorem 5.3 of Rockafellar (1970) . As expectation preserves concavity, TW t is concave for t ď T , and so too is its fixed point T W " W .
Theorem 1 implies that the value V t paq " W t paq`ak{r is concave and strictly increasing. Our concavity logic is unrelated to standard duality theory in economics, as it shows how a minimization p6q yields a convex objective.
17 Equivalently, our option value maximization (5) yields a concave value. Concavity ensues as we capture the constraint by subtracting the convex opportunity cost function χpz, aq of holding z units. For simplicity, consider our tractable special case with constant Poisson arrivals and no deadline. In this case, the expected discount factor is EpB t q " ş 8 0 ρe´p r`ρqs ds " ρ{pr`ρq " β. By (5), the Bellman equation for the stationary option value W is:
since τ and pP, Xq are independent. To fix ideas, consider two extreme cases. If the seller has no option to sell (ρ " 0), his value reduces to the discounted value of dividends position. The value function is concave even though the seller's asset dividends (the first term in (6)) rise linearly in his position. We are unaware of another dynamic programming problem in which strict concavity of the value is not inherited from the stage payoff function -as it is in growth theory. 15 See Corollary 3.2.1 in Lucas, Stokey, and Prescott (1989) . 16 Let the seller choose the new position a 1 " a´y, i.e. app´k{rq´min a 1 Pra´mintx,au,as rpp´k{rqa 1Ẃ t`τ pa 1 qs in (5), minimizing the opportunity cost pp´k{rqa 1´W t`τ pa 1 q of holding assets. 17 The convex profit function arises from an upper envelope maximization, and the concave cost function from a lower envelope minimization. Likewise, the convex bidder's profit function in a private value auction is an upper envelope maximization. But our concave value ensues from a maximization.
V t paq " ak{r. Also, when the asset pays no dividends (k " 0), the value is a pure option on randomly meeting buyers, whose proposed terms of trade are acceptable.
Wage search models are pure stopping exercises (Figure 4 , left), with behavior fully summarized by a reservation wage. But here, as in §3, we must derive a supply function, and this requires characterizing the marginal value V 1 . As a concave function, V 1 is almost everywhere differentiable. But we recursively prove more strongly in §B.2 that it is everywhere differentiable. To do so, we find a unique fixed point of a marginal value operator S on C. In the special case of Poisson arrivals and no deadline -recalling the dividend κ " k{pr`ρq and discount factor β " ρ{pr`ρq -we have a simple recursion:
Theorem 2 The marginal value V 1 t paq exists on r0, 8q, is continuous, and exceeds k{r.
The proof in §B.2 argues that the marginal value operator S is a contraction on C, with unique fixed point V 1 P C. The upper bound V 1 t paq ď k{r`βEpP q{p1´βq is the marginal value of the unconstrained problem.
19 Theorem 1 then implies V 1 t paq´k{r " W 1 t paq ą 0. Equation (8) embeds some essential economics. Assets have a marginal expected dividend value κ until the next meeting, and then an expected continuation value EpmaxtP, V 1 paquq. Analogous to Ω n in §2, call ωpzq " EpmaxtP´V 1 pzq, 0uq ą 0 the optionality of the z-th unit. Just as in §2, the holding cost is the subtracted integral in (8) -namely, the expected optionality gains βηpaq ě 0 arising from all inframarginal units when the seller marginally decreases his position, where:
Corollary 2 In the stationary Poisson arrival case, holding costs ηpaq rise in the asset position, and the marginal value function solves p1´βqV 1 paq " κ`β pωpaq´ηpaqq
As with indivisible units in Corollary 1, the time cost of the marginal value between buyers is the dividend plus the optionality of the marginal unit less its holding cost. Immediate optionality inflates the marginal value, and deferred optionality depresses it.
18 This is analogous to the reservation price equation (4) with indivisible units. As Ω n`Vn " EpmaxtP, ∆V n uq, it yields ∆V n " R n " κ`βpEpmaxtP, ∆V n uq´ř n´1 j"1 α j EpmaxtP´∆V n´j , 0qq.
19 From (8) , in the Poisson model, V 1 p0`q solves McCall's 1970 wage search Bellman equation, i.e. rV 1 p0`q " k`ρErmaxtP´V 1 p0`q, 0us, and thus V 1 p0`q ď k{r`ρErP s{r. This is the same upper bound as for V 1 in the indivisible units model in §2.2. Indeed, V 1 " κ{p1´βq`βEpmaxtP´V 1 , 0uq{p1´βq, by (3), and thus V 1 ď κ{p1´βq`βEpP q{p1´βq. Finally, substitute β " ρ{pr`ρq and κ " k{pr`ρq.
20 This is analogous to the expressions p1´βqW n´1 in §2.1 and β ř n´1 j"1 α j Ω n´j in §2.2.
Holding costs rise in the asset position, by Theorem 1, as more optionality is delayed. Observe that the marginal value is increased by the optionality of the marginal unit ωpaq and decreased by the expected optionality of inframarginal units (i.e. the holding costs).
Without purchase caps, holding costs vanish, and the marginal value recursion (8) is the wage search Bellman equation rV 1 paq " k`ρE pmaxtP´V 1 paq, 0uq. The value function is linear V paq " aV 1 p0`q, and the option to partially sell the position is worthless.
Corollary 3 Assume k ą 0. As the asset position a rises, search optionality is a falling fraction W t paq{V t paq of value, vanishing as a Ñ 8. In the limit, lim aÑ8 V 1 t paq " k{r.
Proof : Since V t p0q " 0 and V t is increasing and concave in a, the secant slope V t paq{a falls in a. Hence, rW t paq{V t paq " r´ak{V t paq falls in a, recalling V t paq " W t paq`ak{r.
Finally, V
Theorem 3 The value and option value functions V t paq and W t paq are strictly concave.
For an intuition, if V t is linear on some interval r0,ās, then so is W t . For a P r0,ās, the optimal supply in (7) is thus y " mintx, au for prices P ěp, and zero otherwise. The first term in the maximand of (7) is then EpP mintX, au|P ěpq. Since its derivative Ep ş 8 a P f pP, xqdx|P ěpq strictly falls in a, this is strictly concave, and thus so is the right side of (7). By the same logic, the value is linear on no sub-interval.
Since the asset position confers valuable trade opportunities, its value exceeds the present value of dividends. But the seller cannot quickly exploit profitable sales due to the purchase caps: Intuitively, a larger position takes longer to unwind, as incremental assets are sold farther in the future. We instead reason oppositely, thinking of the last unit as sold first. Since the last unit has a higher holding cost -i.e., it delays the sale of inframarginal units -the marginal value of assets falls, and thus the value is concave.
Waiting until a buyer arrives willing to purchase everything is intuitively suboptimal. But how should the seller react to partial purchase orders? This reduces to a static sales exercise, in which the marginal value acts as the marginal (opportunity) cost, as in §3.
Figure 5: The Value Function and Inverse Uncapped Supply. At left, we plot the increasing and concave value function V t paq, with slope V 1 t paq Ñ k{r as a Ñ 8. Given a bid price p 0 and asset position a 0 at time t, the trade surplus is the maximum vertical distance of V t paq from the dashed line of slope p 0 . At right, supply is the lesser of the purchase cap x and the uncapped supply Y t0 . The uncapped supply maximizes "producer surplus"; it equates price and marginal value V 1 t pa´yq, soon called the ask price.
Corollary 4 For any asset position a ą 0, bid price p, and cap x, the optimal supply at time t is Y t pp, x, aq " mintx, Y t pp, aqu, where the uncapped supply Y t pp, aq is:
Proof: In a meeting, the seller solves max y rpy`V t pa´yqs s.t. 0 ď y ď x and y ď a. As V t is strictly concave, and the constraints are linear, the FOC is necessary and sufficient for a maximum. Since at most one constraint binds, the constraint qualification for the Kuhn-Tucker conditions is met. If the multipliers are respectively λ 1 , λ 2 , λ 3 ě 0, then the FOC is p´V 1 t pa´yq "´λ 1`λ2`λ3 . By complementary slackness, piq if y " x ď a, then p´V 1 t pa´xq ě 0, and piiq if y " a ă x, then p´V 1 t p0`q ě 0, and piiiq if y " 0, then p´V 1 t paq ď 0. Otherwise, all multipliers vanish, and p " V 1 t pa´yq. Let's flesh out the supply function plotted at the right of Figure 5 . First, never trading is not optimal, as it pays ak{r ă V t paq, by Theorem 2. Rather, the seller's supply (10) is the inverse marginal value function pV 1 t q´1 until the purchase cap binds. Next, supply increases in the asset position and purchase cap. In a trading opportunity, supply (10) vanishes for positions a ă pV 1 t q´1ppq, and then rises with slope one in the asset position until a " x. Just as well, supply (10) vanishes at the cap x " 0, and increases dollar for dollar in the cap until hitting the uncapped supply x " a´pV 1 t q´1ppq. Next, Figure 5 plots the inverse supply function of the bid price, the uniform sell price for quantity y of the position a is p " V The seller increasingly ignores search optionality as his asset position explodes, and by Corollaries 3 and 4, the optimal supply becomes infinitely elastic near price k{r.
Corollary 5
The choke and sell-all prices converge to the dividend value k{r as a Ò 8.
The theory so far has simply relied on the finite mean of purchase caps. We now use the assumption that density f pp, xq is weakly decreasing in x. Unlike with indivisible units in §2, we find that here this is a sufficient condition for the convexity of the marginal value, and yields a supply curve increasing and convex in the bid price.
Theorem 4
The marginal value V 1 t paq is decreasing and strictly convex in a. Moreover, its derivative V 2 t paq ă 0 exists on p0, 8q, is continuous, and is at least V 2 ą´8.
Notably, the endogenous value function of assets has the same properties typically assumed (for unrelated reasons) of money utility functions u: u 2 ă 0 ă u 1 with u 1 convex.
So firms might act as if risk averse and prudent when optimally selling an asset position. To intuit Theorem 4, assume Poisson arrivals and independent limit orders f pp, xq " gppqhpxq. Write the Corollary 2 formula as V 1 paq " κ`β pωpaq`V 1 paq´ηpaqq. If V 1 paq is convex, then so is the optionality ωpaq`V 1 paq " EpmaxtP, V 1 paquq. By recursive logic, the marginal value V 1 paq is convex if the holding costs ηpaq are concave. Loosely, holding costs arise from binding purchase caps, and so are concave when larger purchase caps are less likely, i.e. the cap density hpxq is decreasing. More formally, differentiating (9) yields:
Now, an asset position increment da reduces the chance of full liquidation (sale of all units) by H 1 paqda " hpaqda. Recalling the optionality of the 0-th unit, this alone increases the holding cost by ωp0qhpaqda. Next, since ωpzq " EpmaxtP´V 1 pzq, 0uq ą 0, the optionality of each remaining unit z " a´x P p0, as changes by ω 1 pzqdz, which is positive by Theorem 3. The chance 1´Hpa´zq that one may sell the z-th unit falls by hpa´zqda. This raises holding costs by βω 1 pzqdz hpa´zqda, explaining the integral term in (11). All told, a decreasing purchase cap density leads to marginal holding costs.
Corollary 6 When positive, the uncapped supply Y t pp, aq is increasing and concave in p.
For as V 1 t is decreasing and convex by Theorem 4, its inverse is decreasing and convex in p, and uncapped supply Y t pp, aq " a´pV 1 t q´1ppq in (10) is increasing and concave in p. Altogether, with wage search, a trader stops when he secures a wage in excess of the reservation wage. But in our setting with divisibility and strict concavity, the average exceeds the marginal value, and the seller's trading strategy is governed by the marginal value. Trade may be choked off by the buyer or the seller.
The value function generally evolves with the passage of time. We now offer insights on a special case with a looming deadline T , and time invariant waiting time distribution until that moment. Specifically, Γ t pτ q " 1´e´ρ mintτ,T´tu for all t ď T and Γ t pτ q " 0 if t ą T . Then, for any asset position a ą 0, we prove in §B.3 that the marginal value falls as the calendar time t advances; therefore, by Corollary 4, the supply curve Y t pp, x, aq rises; accordingly, the seller's ask price V 1 t pa´yq falls as the deadline approaches.
21
Towards a more tractable analysis, we henceforth assume the time-stationary Poisson arrivals model for the comparative statics, supply, and bargaining analysis.
Changing Search Frictions and Offer Distributions
We now explore how the derived functions V, V 1 , V 3 change when the parameters k, ρ, r adjust. We next argue that while V 1 ą 0 ą V 2 from Theorems 2 and 3, each inequality grows stricter as search frictions fall: the marginal value rises, but the second derivative falls. Our recursive proof exploits a lemma in Albrecht, Holmlund, and Lang (1991) .
Theorem 5 For any position a ą 0, the value V paq and marginal value V 1 paq fall in r, and rise in ρ and k, while V 2 paq rises in r and falls in ρ and k.
The comparative statics of V and V 1 parallel those in the stationary single unit indivisible search model ( Figure 6 ): As search frictions fall, the value and marginal value increase. But the marginal value falls faster at lower frictions. To wit, the value function flattens. Next, we explore how shifts in the offer distributions affect the value. We consider changes in the price distribution P conditional on a quantity, fixing the purchase cap marginal hpxq, and in the quantity distribution X, conditional on a price, fixing the price marginal gppq. We call these conditional stochastic dominance changes.
Theorem 6
The value V rises with piq conditional first order stochastic dominance increases in P or X, piiq conditional mean-preserving spreads in P , or piiiq conditional mean-preserving contractions in X. The marginal value V 1 rises with piq. With no dividends, the value function only depends on ψ " r{ρ. We posit P " Γp1, 1q and X " Γp0.5, 1q. From thick to thin lines, we plot numerical dynamic programming simulations as search frictions ψ increase: 0.005, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 1 and 2. The marginal value falls dramatically; without purchase caps, the marginal value is constant at V 1 p0`q « 0.4 if ψ " 1.
As with single unit search theory, the seller profits from stochastically better or riskier prices. But quantity risk is different. For offers are truncated by his position, and he exploits only the lower tail of the purchase cap distribution. He profits from stochastically better purchase caps, as his ability to sell his position improves, whereupon values and marginal values both rise. For as the purchase caps stochastically improve, holding costs fall, and so the marginal value and ask price rise. To see this, write holding cost in (9) as βηpaq " βpEpωpa´mintX, auq´p1´Hpaqqωp0qq. The function inside the expectation falls in X, as the optionality of inframarginal units ωpzq rises. To wit, as the purchase caps stochastically improve, and so the cdf Hpaq falls, holding costs fall.
Trading Behavior and The Supply Curve
If a buyer offers more generous terms of trade, the seller is willing to sell more ( Figure 5 ). This reflects how the seller trades off sure money today and possible money tomorrow.
There are a few measures of the willingness to sell. The endogenous arrival rate of acceptable offers equals ρΦpaq " ρp1´F pV 1 paq, 8qq, where Φpaq is the trade chance.
The expected time to trade is τ paq " 1{pρΦpaqq and its variance ξpaq " 1{pρΦpaqq 2 .
Since both fall in the trade chance, given a smaller asset position, higher dividends, or a lower interest rate, the seller is less eager to sell, and the mean and variance of trade times accordingly increase. 22 We argue that the seller finds it increasingly hard to trade as he unwinds his position, and it grows harder to predict the next trade time. Theorem 7 The mean trade time τ paq and its variance ξpaq fall in the asset position a and interest rate r, and rise in the dividend k. The expected trade price EpP |P ě V 1 paqq falls in a, and its variance σ 2 pP |P ě V 1 paqq rises in a if the density gppq is log-concave.
Next consider the supply curve. Since the mean trade price EpP |P ě V 1 paqq falls in the position a, by Theorem 1, the seller holds out for better prices as he sells his position. But as seen in Figure 8 , with a log-concave price density gppq, the variance of traded prices σ 2 pP |P ě V 1 paqq falls in the position a (Heckman and Honoré, 1990) .
Altogether, as the seller sells his position, his terms of trade improve and grow more predictable, and the expected mark-up ErP´V 1 paq|P ě V 1 paqs falls.
As the seller unwinds his position, he grows more picky, and trades less. Consider the supply elasticity for the uncapped supply (10), i.e. E p pp, aq " ppBY pp, aq{Bpq{Y . This is the quotient of the secant and tangent slopes in the right panel of Figure 5 . For large positions, the secant and tangent coincide at priceppaq ă V 1 p0`q, where E p pp, aq " 1. So supply is elastic (E p pp, aq ą 1) for low prices p ăppaq, and otherwise inelastic (E p pp, aq ă 1). Next, consider the seller's transactional behavior. An instructive contrast is to Kyle's long-lived 1985 insider, say in possession of unfavorable information, and thus wishing to sell. His equilibrium trading rule optimally trades off exploiting his informational edge and securing its fruits. Whereas Kyle's insider has a falling supply curve, because he depresses the price by selling more today (!), ours only sells more more when offered a higher bid price. Kyle also finds that market depth -an inverse measure of the price impact of trades -is constant over time. In our model, depth is best captured by the slope (not elasticity) of the residual inverse supply 1{Λpy, aq "´1{V 2 pa´yq. And unlike in Kyle, it increases in the position and falls in the trade size, by Theorem 4. At left, when P " Γp1.6, 1{1.6q, so EpP q " 1 and σ 2 pP q " 0.625. At right, when P " Γp1, 1q, so EpP q " 1 and σ 2 pP q " 1. Both numerical dynamic programming simulations assume X " Γp0.5, 1q.
One final measure of the seller's supply curve is the purchase premium πpy, aq " V 1 pa´yq´V 1 paq over his choke price for trades y ă a. The premium is intuitively smaller when he has a smaller price impact, as the next result summarizes.
Theorem 8 piq Supply Ypp, x, aq is nondecreasing in a, r, and nonincreasing in ρ, k.
piiq The supply elasticity E p pp, aq is decreasing and convex in a, and vanishes as a Ñ 8. Depth 1{Λpy, aq is increasing in a and decreasing in y. It falls in ρ and k, and rises in r.
piiiq The purchase premium πpy, aq is increasing in the trade size y ă a and decreasing in assets a. It falls in r, and rises in ρ and k.
As the asset position falls, optionality figures more prominently in his optimization, by Lemma 3. Accordingly, the purchase premium rises, depth falls, and supply elasticity rises -the ask-price grows more responsive to the trades ( Figure 9 ). As the position vanishes, the seller exploits asset divisibility less, and price converges to the sell-all price.
As the position a explodes, the optimal sales policy converges to a stationary rule -the seller avails himself fully of all limit offers with prices p ě k{r, and otherwise abstains. Indeed, V 1 paq Ñ k{r as a Ñ 8, by Lemma 3. But sales stochastically drift down as the seller's position unwinds. For the seller's own cap starts to bind more than the purchase caps, and he simultaneously grows more choosy due to value concavity -e.g. his choke price rises. A nearly stationary rule is once again optimal for small positions a, selling out for any price p ą V 1 p0`q, and the purchase caps don't bind.
It might seem intuitive that trade worsens with greater search frictions. With a higher interest rate or a lower arrival rate, Theorem 8 asserts that the seller's chosen trade volume and depth rises, and the purchase premium falls. On the other hand, with a log-concave price marginal gppq, trade prices fall and grow more volatile with more Figure 9 : Ease of Trade. Assume k " 0. We plot the supply curve for changing asset positions (left), and the purchase premium (for a " 5) and the time to trade for search frictions ψ " r{ρ ranging in t0.005, 0.1, 0.5u from thick to thin lines. search frictions, and the expected markup rises 24 -for V 1 falls, by Theorem 5.
Search and Nash Bargaining
Trade opportunities only arrive periodically, and so should be subject to negotiation. Nash bargaining over prices is commonly assumed in the monetary search literature. We argue below that we can easily modify our model to incorporate the Nash bargaining solution. We show that our results all naturally extend, but that the model is now richer, and affords further results about the negotiated trade price, quantity, and trade value. For expositional purposes, consider the case of a land owner (the seller) liquidating his production stock in strawberries. Offers arrive randomly, when a buyer stops by driving his vehicle. Buyers vary in their willingness to pay w and in their carrying capacity x, since some drive bicycles, some small cars, some pickup trucks.
Assume bargaining weights δ P r0, 1s and 1´δ on the surplus of the seller and buyer, respectively. The seller's surplus of trading (over not trading) is spp, y, aq " py`Vpa´yq´Vpaq, and the buyer's surplus is pw´pqy. The terms of trade dictated by the Nash solution entail a negotiated price P and bargained supply Υ functions obeying:
pPpw, x, aq, Υpw, x, aqq " arg max
We solve this maximization in stages. The FOC in p suffices by concavity in p. Given the reservation offer pw, xq, the negotiated price is the weighted average of the two parties'
24 It might seem puzzling that the expected markup ErP´V 1 paq|P ě V 1 paqs rises and yet the purchase premium falls. But the seller's first order condition p´V 1 pa´yq " 0 only holds for interior solutions. Absent purchase caps, it would be an identity, and the expected markup equals the premium πpy, aq. reservation prices:
The seller and buyer respectively secure fractions δ and 1´δ of the total surplus Spw, x, aq. The bargained supply must maximize total surplus, namely, Υpw, x, aq " arg max yPr0,mintx,aus Spw, x, aq, exactly as in our original model. We offer some insights:
Observe that the Nash bargaining model is formally equivalent to the original model with a lower arrival rate ρδ of offers pw, xq drawn from the density f . For since the seller is risk neutral, we can imagine that he secures price w with chance δ and otherwise gets his reservation (zero surplus) price. We recover our original model with δ " 1. The case δ " 0 erases all trade surplus, and the seller holds assets for their dividend stream, i.e. Vpaq " ak{r. Hence, greater buyer bargaining power is formally equivalent to higher search frictions. The seller's value, marginal value and absolute second derivative are scaled lower with bargaining, since Vpa|ρ, δq " V pa|δρq and V 1 pa|ρ, δq " V 1 pa|δρq, and recalling Theorem 5. Given this logic, we now review how bargaining impacts our results.
1. We first observe that the negotiated price and bargained supply rise in the cap. The price is p " Ppw, x, aq in (13) when evaluated at y " Υpw, x, aq. Since bargained supply Υpw, x, aq rises in x, so too does Ppw, x, aq, by concavity of the value function.
For example, assume two buyers with the same reservation price w. If one drives a large truck, and the other rides a bike, then we predict that the truck driver buys more than and yet pays a steeper price: There is no volume discount! The reason owes to the option value of asset. For the seller's marginal benefit is constant at w, while the seller's marginal cost is rising in the quantity sold, by the concavity of the value function.
2. We next note that greater bargaining power for buyers raises supply and lowers the negotiated price, the choke price, and the sell-all price: The bargained supply Υpw, x, aq is given by (10) but with meeting rate ρδ. By Theorem 8piq, it falls in the seller's bargaining power δ. Since the buyer secures a fraction 1´δ of total surplus Spw, x, aq:
Recall that Spw, x, aq " max yPr0,mintx,aus ş y 0 pp´V 1 pa´zqqdz falls in δ by Theorem 5. In the corner solution when Υpw, x, aq " mintx, au, the price Ppw, x, aq rises in δ. We claim that this holds generally when Υpw, x, aq ă mintx, au and w " V 1 pa´Υpw, x, aqq.
For define the trade surplus spy, aq " Vpa´yq`V 1 pa´yqy´Vpaq, and rewrite (14) as
Ppw, x, aq " w´p1´δqspΥpw, x, aq, aq{Υpw, x, aq. Appendix Lemma B.1 verifies that spy, aq{y rises in y. Thus, spΥpw, x, aq, aq{Υpw, x, aq falls in δ, since Υpw, x, aq falls in δ. Finally, the two threshold prices fall as V 1 paq ă V 1 paq.
The logic of this point implies that with greater search frictions, not only does the bargained supply increase (as is true without bargaining), but the negotiated price falls.
3. Next, the bargained supply rises in the position, and the negotiated price falls. Supply rises just as in (10). Substitute the optimal supply y " Υpw, x, aq into (12). This reduces to p ¶q: Υpw, x, aqpp´cpΥpw, x, aq, aqq δ pw´pq 1´δ , where the secant slope of V is cpy, aq " rVpaq´Vpa´yqs{y "
First, by Topkis (1978) , the price Ppw, x, aq rises in a since p ¶q is log-supermodular in pp,´aq -as its middle factor pp´cpΥpw, x, aq, aqq δ is log-supermodular in pp,´aq.
For the slope Υ a pw, x, aq ď 1, as in (10). So substituting y " Υpw, x, aq in (15), the argument a´p1´zqy rises in a, i.e. cpΥpw, x, aq, aq falls in a, as V is concave.
4. The trade value is increasing and concave in the position a until the cap binds, and then decreasing and convex. Without bargaining, the trade value plot mirrors the supply (10), since the price is fixed -it is piecewise linear in the position a, rising with slope w until V 1 pa´mintx, auq " w, and then is constant. With bargaining, the trade value Ppw, x, aqΥpw, x, aq initially vanishes, then is increasing and strictly concave in a until V 1 pa´mintx, auq " w, and then decreasing and strictly convex. 25 For supply is fixed at x, but the price is decreasing and strictly convex in the asset position a.
5.
Bargaining lowers the trade value, except for low reservation prices and positions. For reservation values w above the sell-all price V 1 p0`q ą V 1 p0`q, supply is unchanged and the price is lower, and so the trade value lower. Next, consider lower w. The bargained supply Υpw, x, aq has unit slope in a, and surplus Spw, x, aq rises in a. So from (14), the trade value Ppw, x, aqΥpw, x, aq has slope at most w in a. But the slope in a of the trade value wYpw, x, aq without bargaining is w, recalling Theorem 4. Since the maximum trade revenue Ppw, x, aqΥpw, x, aq lies below its no-bargaining counterpart wx, and falls after peaking, the two trade values cross (Figure 10 ).
6. Greater bargaining power for buyers lowers the mean and variance of waiting times. As in Theorem 7, this follows because the chance of a desirable trade p1´F pV 1 paq, 8qq
is now higher -because V 1 rises in ρ and thus in δ, by Theorem 5.
7. Greater bargaining power for buyers raises depth and lowers the purchase premium. For the FOC w " V 1 pa´yq implies the inverse uncapped supply curve (13):
25 By (13), the trade value is δwΥpw, x, aq`p1´δqpVpaq´Vpa´Υpw, x, aqq, and a´Υpw, x, aq is constant in a when the purchase cap does not bind, by (10). Finally, Υpw, x, aq is piecewise linear, and V 1 paq falls and is strictly convex. . At left, wYpw, x, aq ą Ppw, x, aqΥpw, x, aq when w ą V 1 p0`q. At right, when w ď V 1 p0`q, the trade value rises for low positions a ď a 0 . At positions a 1 and a 2 , the purchase cap binds with and without bargaining.
Firstly, depth is the inverse slope Λpy, aq " pBppy, aq{Byq´1, and the uncapped supply has slope p 1 py, aq "´δV 2 pa´yq`p1´δqc 1 py, aq, where c 1 py, aq "´y´2
recalling (15). Next, using (16), rewrite the purchase premium Πpy, aq " ppy, aq´V 1 paq
By our equivalence result, it suffices that V 2 fall in ρ and thus in δ (true by Theorem 5).
8. The qualitative behavior of market depth, the purchase premium, and the sales elasticity claimed in Theorem 8 still hold with bargaining, as verified in Appendix B.6.
Conclusions
The large search literature in economics has assumed that individual optimizations either involve indivisible units, or only a single period, before access to an outside option.
We have extended dynamic search to allow for multiple units. We first closely hewed to the standard wage or price search model, and assumed a seller owned many indivisible units. We first assume that buyers each only desire one unit. Inducting on the number of units, we prove that the reservation price strictly falls with more units, but has diminishing increments. This is consistent with a Bellman value increasing at a decreasing rate, with a positive third difference. So the seller is choosier with a smaller position.
We then assume that arriving buyers may seek more than one unit, but that the seller can partially exercise the requests. We analyze this an intensive margin. Barring a high enough price, the seller only partially exercises the limit order. In this case, the reservation price strictly falls with more units, but at an increasing or decreasing rate.
Our formulation and result resolves a confusion from 1993 operations research paper.
Values and reservation prices reflect holding costs -namely, the expected cost of delayed search surplus from one's inframarginal units. As the asset position rises, so do holding costs, and reservation price falls. Holding costs shed light on the perfectly divisible asset model. In this setting, we proceed instead recursively, exploiting contraction properties. But we find parallel results to our indivisible unit world: the value of assets is concave, and more strongly the marginal value is convex when the purchase caps have a falling density. We also offer a novel contraction proof idea for establishing the differentiability of the value function, when existing methods cannot be employed.
Our model is rich and tractable, and allows a range of quick predictions for the change in values and reservation prices as the dividend changes, the seller grows more impatient, buyer arrivals increase, or the price or purchase cap distribution changes. Our model helps extend search insights to trade models with rarer trading opportunities. Indeed, search models famously capture settings with temporal market power, where prices are bargained -as might aptly describe many financial settings.
We hope that our model can be a key ingredient in a wealth of equilibrium analyses in which the buyers' behavior is derived and not exogenously specified. Our paper should allow, e.g., multiple periods of search before markets open in money papers. We are currently extending the analysis to a middleman managing his inventory, who both buys from periodically arriving sellers, and sells to periodically arriving buyers.
In our model, search intensity is not a choice variable. But since our holding costs are increasing, a referee has highlighted how the incentive to search increases in holdings. For instance, a seller holding a large position has an added incentive to advertise. Analyzing this is obviously beyond the scope of this paper, but is an extremely natural next step.
Amongst the Pandora's box of model twists, a referee suggested a fixed flow search cost. This invalidates value concavity, and hence the simple search at the margin insights. In this case, the seller offers a quantity discount, for instance, when his position is small. The first reservation price V 1 obeys the Bellman recursion V 1 " κ`βEpmaxtP, V 1 uq. Let the seller's search profit bep " p´κ{p1´βq, and M pwq " EpmaxtP , wuq the expected maximum payoff. So M p0q ą 0 and its right derivative is sandwiched 0 ď M 1 pwq ď 1. The option value W 1 " V 1´κ {p1´βq, or expected surplus over rental income, uniquely solves W 1 " βM pW 1 q, and is sandwiched 0 ă W 1 ă p´κ{p1´βq (Figure 11 ).
Result 1: Option Values Rise in Holdings. The Bellman equation yields the recursion:
We argue inductively that ∆W n`1 " W n`1´Wn ą 0 for n ě 0. First, W 1 ą 0 " W 0 . Assume W n ą W n´1 and W n ą 0. Given the derived slope bound M 1 pwq ď 1, we have M pw´W n q`W n ě M pw´W n´1 q`W n´1 , and so the unique fixed point W n`1 of (17) is higher with index n`1 than index n, namely, W n`1 ě W n . Then recursion (17) gives:
Since W 1 " βM pW 1 q, the right panel of Figure 11 implies 0 ď ∆W n`1 ď W 1 . Hence, ∆W n`1 ă p´κ{p1´βq. The earlier inequality M 1 ď 1 is strict inside the convex hull of the price support, as M pwq ă w. As M 1 ă 1 on r0, p´κ{p1´βqq, we have ∆W n`1 ą 0.
Result 2: Reservation Prices Fall in Holdings. 28 The increments ∆R n`1 "
27 Note that (17) admits a unique solution W n ą 0 since the map is a contraction, given M 1 pwq ď 1 and β ă 1. Also, W n ą 0 for all n since M 1 pwq ď 1 and W n´1 ě 0 implies M p´W n´1 q`W n´1 ě M p0q ą 0. 28 We now offer a more formal intuition in §2.1 for why greater holdings increase the marginal gains of reservation price reductions. Fix the continuation valueV n´1 . Write the policy equationV n pRq " nκ`βrp1´F pRqqpEpP |P ě Rq`V n´1 q`F pRqV n pRqs as:
The R derivative of the incremental value ∆V n pRq is negative -as the lead factor falls in R and the surplusW n "V n´1´p nκ{p1´βqq rises in n, by Step 1. Thus, the optimal reservation price R falls in n.
∆ 2 W n`1 " ∆W n`1´∆ W n fall if and only if there is diminishing option value increments. Now, differencing (18) yields:
Then ∆ 2 W n`1 ă β pM p∆W n`1 q´M p∆W n qq, as ∆W n ą 0. Since M 1 ă 1 in our domain, if ∆W n`1 ě ∆W n , then 0 ď M p∆W n`1 q´M p∆W n q ă ∆ 2 W n`1 . But then the last two inequalities for ∆ 2 W n`1 contradict. So ∆ 2 W n`1 ă 0 obtains for all n " 1, 2, . . ., and the reservation prices R n " V n´Vn´1 " W n´Wn´1`κ {p1´βq fall in n. Altogether, option values W n rise at a falling rate, and thus reservation prices fall in holdings.
Result 3: Reservation Prices Fall in Holdings at a Decreasing Rate. For the next step, we difference the marginal value expression (20) once more to get:
we get a contradiction (as 0 ă β ă 1):
Then ∆ 3 W n`1 ą 0. So reservation prices R n fall with diminishing absolute decrements.
As values increase at diminishing rate and V n´n κ{p1´βq ă βEpP q{p1´βq ă 8, option values vanish for large n. Eventually reservation prices just reflect dividends.
A.2 Search with Multiple Unit Sales: Proofs of Results
LetW 2 be the value of two units if no one ever just wants to buy just one unit: α 1 " 0. ThenW 2 " 2W 1 , as the sales policy for one unit is feasible and so optimal. This yields an upper bound W 2 ďW 2 " 2W 1 across all α 1 . The inequality is strict for α 1 ą 0: For (3) implies F 2 pW 1 , 2W 1 |α 2 q " 2W 1´α1 p1´βqW 1 ă 2W 1 but F 2 pW 1 , W 2 |α 2 q " W 2 and so 2W 1 ą W 2 -by the logic captured in Figure 11 . Then ∆W 1 ą ∆W 2 . We next argue inductively. Assume (;): ∆W 1 ą¨¨¨ą ∆W n ą 0 for n ě 2. We want ∆W n ą ∆W n`1 . Consider the upper envelope of `1 linear ex post payoff functions:
29 If x ą x 1 ą x 2 and c P R, then maxtx 2 , cu`maxtx, cu´2 maxtx 1 , cu ě mintx 2`x´2 x 1 , 0u, as can be verified by checking cases. Finally, the inequality holds taking expectations over c " P´κ{p1´βq.
We claim that this kinks upward inp at ∆W n`1´i for i " 1, . . . , , or in p at ∆V n`1´i , as in Figure 3 (right). For selling i units is best iffp exceeds the average (opportunity) cost of selling m 1 ď i fewer units, and is at most the average cost of selling m more units:
By induction assumption (;), the discrete SOC globally obtains for the inframarginal units. So optimality reduces to the discrete FOC with m " m 1 " 1. Selling i units is optimal iff ∆W n´i`1 ďp ď ∆W n´i . As Ω j " EpmaxtP´∆W j , 0uq, the expected upper envelope is ErU n pP , qs " ř n j"n`1´ Ω j , as seen earlier in Figure 3 . Using summation by parts (with the Figure 3 formula), rewrite (3) as
Next, twice differencing (23), using A 0 " 0 and A n´An`1 "´α n`1 , yields
Since p1´βqW 1 " βEpmaxtP´W 1 , 0uq, we have ∆W 1 " W 1 ă EpmaxtP , 0uq. Given price variance andP ą 0 sometimes,P ą EpmaxtP , 0uq ě ∆W 1 with positive chance.
Since Ω 1 ą 0, and Ω j " EpmaxtP´∆W j , 0uq by p♣q, p♥q and p♠q -still valid in §2.2 -and induction assumption (;), we have p:q: Ω 1 ă¨¨¨ă Ω n . For a contradiction, assume ∆W n`1 ě ∆W n . Together, (24) and p:q imply βpΩ n`1´Ωn q ą p1´βqp∆W n`1´∆ W n q ě 0. But ∆W n`1 ě ∆W n implies Ω n`1 " EpmaxtP´∆W n`1 , 0uq ď Ω n . Contradiction. For the remaining part of Corollary 1, observe that for a sale of i units, (22) implies that reservation prices optimally depend on final holdings n´i and not the sales quantity or original holdings, and that R n´i`1 " ∆V n´i`1 . When i " 1, (23) and R n " ∆W nκ {p1´βq yield p1´βqR n " κ`βpΩ n´ř n´1 j"1 α n´j Ω j ). We first show that T maps C Ñ C with bound W "βEpP Xq{p1´βq. Relaxing the 30 E.g. differentiating a smooth function wpxq " ş x 1 r1´F px´tqsHptqdt analogously yields w 1 pxq " Hpxq´ş x 1 f px´tqHptqdt and then w 2 pxq "´ş
asset constraint in (5), if we assumeW t ď W , then T preserves the upper bound:
Since the maximum of a continuous function pp´k{rqy`W t`τ pa´yq is continuous in a (Theorem of the Maximum), f P C, and Γ t is continuous in t, we have T : C Ñ C. We check the Blackwell sufficient conditions for a contraction. By inspection, T is monotone. Likewise, T pW t`b qpaq ď pT W t qpaq`βb, whereβ ă 1. As C is a complete metric space with the sup norm, by the Contraction Mapping Theorem, T W t " W t P C is unique.
Monotonicity of Recursion Operator: Proof of Theorem 1. As T is a contraction, and monotonicity in a is a closed property in C 1 with the sup norm, it suffices that monotonicity is preserved by T for all t (Corollary 3.2.1 in Lucas, Stokey, and Prescott (1989) ). From p5q, since the choice set and the objective function increase in a (by assumption), if a 1 ą a then pT W t qpaq ď pT W t qpa 1 q. So the fixed point increases in a, for all t. Next, W t paq strictly rises in a, for one sales strategy available at b ą a is to act as if one's position is a, and for unexploited offers F p0, aq ą 0, sell at any p ą k{r. So surplus is at least ErmaxtP´k{r, 0u mintb´a, X´mintX, auus ą 0.
B.2 Value Function Differentiability: Proof of Theorem 2
Let the average dividend be D t " pk{rqp1´E t pB t qq. The marginal value operator S is:
We show that there exists a unique bounded continuous function U t " SU t , recalling (25). We also show that any such fixed point U is the derivative in a of V t paq " W t paq`ak{r, where W t " T W t ; in other words, U t " V 1 t . We attack these tasks in reverse order. Step 1. We know from Lemma 1 that V t satisfies the Bellman equation:
If V t is continuously differentiable in a on r0, 8q, then Corollary 4 is valid (as its proof only exploits concavity in a of V t . So Corollary 5 in Milgrom and Segal (2002) applies, and the derivative of the second term, the expectation, in (26) is: E t pB t rV 1 t`τ pa´Y t`τ pP, X, aqq`λ 2 pY t`τ pP, X, aqqsq
Since λ 2 " 0 if 0 ď Y t`τ pp, x, aq ă mintx, au, when p ď V 1 t`τ pa´mintx, auq, then V 1 t`τ pa´Y t`τ pp, x, aqq`λ 2 pY t`τ pp, x, aqq" maxtp, V 1 t`τ paqu. Otherwise, λ 2 " 0 if x ď a, so V 1 t`τ pa´Y t`τ pp, x, aqq`λ 2 pY t`τ pp, x, aqq " mintp, V 1 t`τ pa´mintx, auqp1`χ r0,as pxqqu. Hence, (27) is E t pB t maxtV 1 t`τ paq, mintP, V 1 t`τ pa´mintX, auqp1`χ r0,as pXqquuq. Add D t to get (25). So, if (26) has a differentiable solution, then its derivative satisfies (25).
Step 2. We show that S is a contracting operator, and so has a unique bounded and continuous fixed point U t " SU t , with bound U " k{r`βEpP q{p1´βq. Assume U P C with 0 ď U t paq ď U . Since 0 ď pSU t qpaq ď U by (25), the bound U is preserved. The continuity in t follows from continuity of Γ t in t. To see that S preserves continuity in a, let a ě 0, and consider any sequence a n Ñ a, for a fixed t ď T . To understand (25), let:
µ t,n pp, xq ": maxtU t pa n q, mintp, U t pa n´m intx, a n uqp1`χ r0,ans pxqquu
Since 0 ď µ t,n pp, xq ď U t pa n q`p ď U`p ă 8, the Dominated Convergence Theorem yields lim nÑ8 E t pB t µ t`τ,n pP, Xqq " E t pB t lim nÑ8 µ t`τ,n pP, Xqq. So lim anÑ8 SU t pa n q " SU t paq, whence S : C Ñ C. Next, S satisfies Blackwell's two sufficient conditions for a contraction: it is monotone, and obeys SpU t`b qpaq ď pSU t qpaq`βb, whereβ ă 1. Hence, SU t " U t P C is unique. Finally V The marginal value exists, by Theorem 2. Write the max in (25) as maxpu i , minpp, γ i l ifor i " 1, 2. The value is concave, by Theorem 1. So if a 2 ą a 1 , then u 2 ď u 1 " V 1 t`τ pa 1 q and γ 2 ď γ 1 " V 1 t`τ pa 1´m intx, a 1 uq, while l 2 ď l 1 as χ r0,as pxq is monotone in a. Now: maxpu 2 , minpp, γ 2 l 2 qq´maxpu 1 , minpp, γ 1 l 1ď maxpu 1 , minpp, γ 1 l 2 qq´maxpu 1 , minpp, γ 1 l 1 qq
The right side is nonpositive, and vanishes if the max is the first argument (p ă u 1 ). Otherwise, it is mintp, γ 1 l 2 u´mintp, γ 1 l 1 u, and so vanishes if l 1 " l 2 . The only nonzero terms arise when l 1 " 8 ą and l 2 " 1 (i.e. a 1 ă x ă a 2 ) and p ą V 1 t`τ p0`q ą γ 1 , in which case: mintp, γ 1 l 2 u´mintp, γ 1 l 1 u " mintp, γ 1 u´p " γ 1´p ă 0.
Taking expectation yields V 1 t pa 2 q´V 1 t pa 1 q ď E t`Bt R rV 1 t`τ p0`q´psF pdp, dxq˘ă 0 on the rectangle R " rV 1 t`τ p0`q, 8qˆra 1 , a 2 s, since purchase caps have a convex support. Then S maps from the set of decreasing functions of a to the set of strictly decreasing functions of a. Hence, the marginal value fixed point V 1 t of S strictly falls in a for all t ď T , by Corollary 3.2.1 in Lucas, Stokey, and Prescott (1989 Assume that V 1 t paq is convex in a, for all t ď T . Since ş u 0 F pp, 8q is increasing and convex in u, by Theorem 5.1 in Rockafellar (1970) , ş V 1 t`τ paq 0 F pp, 8qdp is convex in a for all t ď T . Since BY t pp, aq{Ba " 1 by Corollary 4, the subtracted second integral in (29) is also convex (in a) since its derivative E t´Bt ş 8 0 ş 8 p f ps, Y t`τ pp, aqqdsdp¯is weakly decreasing since f ps, yq is weakly falling in y. In summary, S preserves convexity in a for all t ď T , which is a closed property under the sup norm. So the fixed point SV 1 t is strictly convex whenever V Conversely, if H is a contraction, its unique fixed point is U t " V θ " r,´ρ,´k by Theorem 5, Ypp, x, aq rises in θ (Theorem 6.1 in Topkis (1978) We have shown (in §8, point 4) that cpΥpw, aq, aq and Ppw, x, aq fall in a, and Theorem 8 proves that the elasticity E w pΥpw, x, aqq falls in a. The right side of (36) rises in a. So the bargained supply elasticity HpPpw, x, aq, aq falls in the position a. Next, since the two other transactional liquidity measures -depth and purchase premium -are expressed in terms of the inverse uncapped supply (16), it suffices to understand the marginal value V 1 and secant slope cpy, aq.
Lemma B.1 (Secant) The secant slope cpy, aq is increasing in y, ρ, k, and δ, falling in a and r, supermodular in py,´aq, py,´rq, py, ρq, py, δq, and py, kq, and convex in y. 
